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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and the
size of the informal economy. Recent experimental and empirical research links,
in turn, ethnicity and trust, and trust and tax compliance. In addition, recent
empirical studies have identiﬁed an unwillingness to contribute to public goods
beneﬁting other ethnic groups. Combining these insights, we argue that increasing
ethnic fractionalization decreases voluntary tax compliance, and present empirical
evidence at the macro level in a cross-section of more than ﬁfty countries, that
more ethnically fragmented societies have signiﬁcantly larger informal sectors.
Keywords: informal sector, ethnic fragmentation, voluntary tax compliance
JEL-classiﬁcation: H26, J15, O17
∗I thank Henrik Jensen, Søren Bo Nielsen, Christian Schultz, Torsten Sløk, and seminar and confer-
ence participants at CEBR (Copenhagen), the 3rd Nordic Ph.D. Workshop on Development Economics,
and the 2001 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, for comments and
suggestions. All errors are my own. The activities of EPRU are ﬁnanced by a grant from the Danish
National Research Foundation.
†Economic Policy Research Unit and Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Stud-
iestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Phone: +45 3532 4412. Fax: +45 3532 4444. E-mail:
David.Dreyer.Lassen@econ.ku.dk.1 Introduction
Tax compliance and administration are central issues in public ﬁnance. For developing
economies, diﬃculties in tax collection remain a major obstacle for economic develop-
ment. Tax evasion and large informal sectors can force governments and tax agencies to
increase tax rates on activities less prone to evasion, resulting in increased distortions
that can have adverse eﬀects on investment and growth and, additionally, non-compliance
can result in eﬀective tax systems being less equitable than those legislated. These prob-
lems of noncompliance are present also in the developed world; for example, European
countries are currently considering how to ﬁnance extensive welfare state programs in
the face of adverse demographic changes, and the presence of large scale tax evasion will
make this even harder.1
This paper provides the ﬁrst cross-country empirical investigation of two explanations
for the size of the informal sector that have received much attention in the literature
on tax compliance and administration, particularly regarding developing countries:2 (i)
T h ed e g r e eo fv o l u n t a r yt a xc o m p l i a n c ea n d( i i )t h es i z eo ft h er u r a l ,o ra g r i c u l t u r a l ,
economy. While the latter is straightforwardly tested using available data, I draw on
recent experimental and empirical research in economics, political science and social
psychology to formulate the hypothesis that the degree of voluntary tax compliance —
and the size of the informal sector — depends on the degree of ethnic fragmentation
in society: Ethnic fragmentation (i) decreases the level of trust, which decreases tax
compliance and (ii) increases the unwillingness to contribute to ﬁnancing public goods,
to the extent that these (primarily) beneﬁt other ethnic groups.
This approach might give some insight into why developing nations, some of which
— especially in Africa — are characterized by a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, have
larger informal sectors. While ethnic heterogeneity could be one of many reasons many
1See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for a thorough discussion of the importance of tax administration
issues for tax policy.
2See, e.g., Goode (1952) and Kaldor (1963), and Burgess and Stern (1993) for a recent overview.
1developing countries have problems securing (voluntary) support for taxation, it is also
very relevant for the discussion concerning the ﬁnancing of Europe’s extensive welfare
state programs, given that — the historically very homogenous — European countries are
currently experiencing increasing ethnic heterogeneity due to immigration and, further,
that an integrated European Union itself will be an area with a high degree of ethnic,
linguistic and religious fragmentation.
While there is by now a substantial theoretical literature on tax compliance and the
size of the informal sector, comparative empirical evidence — for obvious reasons — is
more scarce. In the ﬁrst cross-country study of the informal sector, Friedman, Johnson,
Kaufman and Zoido-Lobatòn (2000) ﬁnd that the size of the informal sector increases in
the level of corruption, measured in a variety of ways. They do not, however, consider
the eﬀect of societal heterogeneity on the informal sector, and generally control only for
two explanatory variables at a time.
A small, recent group of papers address issues related to the analysis presented here.
Slemrod (1998, 2001) suggests, without testing it empirically, that voluntary tax com-
pliance is linked to social capital and trust.3 Scholz and Lubell (1998b) ﬁnd, linking
survey data on attitudes with micro data on tax compliance for the U.S., that trust in
others increases tax compliance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
consider trust in large organizations. In their analysis, they instrument a survey measure
of tax compliance as a proxy for trust by the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
without discussing their ﬁnding.4
This paper provides a framework for why ethnic fractionalization, through trust,
matters for tax compliance. The resulting hypothesis is tested using as the dependent
variable actual estimates of the size of the informal sector, rather than the qualitative
survey measure employed by La Porta et al. Finally, the empirical analysis employs a
3Social capital, like trust, is inﬂuenced by ethnic heterogeneity; see Knack and Keefer (1997) and
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000). Cross-country measures of trust has been carried out in the World Value
Surveys, but these so far cover only a limited number of countries.
4The survey measure is from the World Competetiveness Yearbook, and asks a group of respondents
to rate qualitatively the severity of tax evasion in their country.
2wider set of control variables in a larger sample.
The next section presents the theory and derives the testable hypothesis, and section
three describes the empirical model and the data. Section four presents econometric
evidence that conﬁrms the main hypothesis at the macro level, and section ﬁve concludes.
2 Voluntary tax compliance and ethnic divisions: A
hypothesis
The economic literature on tax evasion has largely been built on Becker’s (1968) economics-
of-crime approach. Pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the possibility of tax
evasion is modelled as essentially adding to the tax payer optimization problem a risky
asset, the return of which is determined by tax rates, ﬁnes and the risks of detection. In
accordance with the theory, it has been established empirically that tax payers respond
to incentives such as changes in the audit probabilities. However, two (related) puzzles
for the theory remain. First, tax collection based strictly on enforcement in environ-
ments where the return on taxes is very low is remarkably ineﬀective.5 Second, given
the existing degree of enforcement in industrial countries, characterized by low audit
probabilities, tax compliance is remarkably high.6
A possible solution to the puzzles is the existence of voluntary tax compliance.O b -
served already by Machiavelli, “no prince can govern long unless most citizens willingly
obey the laws of the land.”7 Tax payers who voluntarily comply choose to pay taxes —
that is, they do not (actively) engage in non-compliance. Goode (1952), summarizing
his experience as advisor to the IMF, made the case for voluntary tax compliance half
a century ago, arguing that “a large degree of voluntary compliance on the part of tax
payers [is a] requirement for satisfactory income taxation.” Though empirical evidence
on the prevalence of voluntary tax compliance is non-existent, and experimental evidence
5Collins (1988) on tax evasion in absolutist France, Cheibub (1998) on taxation in dictatorships and
democracies and Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) on the use of violence in tax collection in comtemporary
Tanzania.
6Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998, p. 819).
7Cited in Roth et al. (1989, p. 118).
3is scarce, many, such as Slemrod (1998, 2001), remain convinced of its importance.
It is important, therefore, to identify the causes of voluntary tax compliance or the
lack thereof. Based on her historical and comparative work on tax evasion, Levi (1988, p.
5 3 )a r g u e st h a tv o l u n t a r yc o m p l i a n c ew i l lo c c u r“ o n l yw h e nt a x p a y e r sh a v ec o n ﬁdence
that (1) rulers will keep their bargain and (2) the other constituents will keep theirs.
Taxpayers are strategic actors who will cooperate only when they can expect others to
cooperate as well. The compliance of each depends on the compliance of the others. No
one prefers to be a “sucker.” ”
Following Levi’s classiﬁcation, voluntary tax compliance is inﬂuenced by two (im-
plicit) social contracts. The horizontal contract concerns the perceived fairness of the
tax payment: If people expect others to evade or avoid taxes, they will try to do so them-
selves, whereas people expecting others to comply will comply themselves. The vertical
contract concerns what has been called the quid pro quo of taxation: Do tax payers
get “suﬃcient” public goods in exchange for taxes paid?8 And do they get the public
goods mix they prefer? In the Allingham-Sandmo model, taxes ﬁnance an exogenous
revenue requirement, and tax payers are not concerned with what they get in exchange
for taxes paid; hence, there is no quid pro quo. In the following, I argue that ethnic
fractionalization can aﬀect the size of the informal sector through both the horizontal
and the vertical contracts.
2.1 The horizontal contract
Experimental evidence from social and political psychology has established that (a) the
level of trust and the degree of trustworthiness decreases with ethnic diversity (Zucker,
1986; Tyler, 1998; Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001), and that (b) tax
compliance increases with trust (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Scholz and Lubell, 1998a,b;
Scholz, 1998). The argument given is that people are willing to comply if they know
that everyone else complies. If people do not trust others to comply, they choose to
8This is sometimes referred to as exchange equity (Spicer and Lundstedt (1976)).
4evade taxes themselves. Tax payer surveys and experimental evidence support this. For
example, Laurin (1986, p. 185-7) reports survey evidence from Sweden that people who
think that other tax payers underreport are more likely to do so themselves.9
What is the theoretical basis for such a behavior? Tax compliance is typically mod-
elled as a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. In PDs, non-compliance is a strictly dominant
strategy; the role of tax enforcement, then, is to promote compliance by decreasing the
gains from non-compliance. However, as noted by Andreoni et al. (1998), the expected
penalties found in actual tax enforcement systems are not large enough to make compli-
ance a dominant strategy. Therefore, accounting for tax enforcement still leaves players
i naP D .B u tp e o p l ep a yt a x e sa n y w a y .
The fact that people pay taxes, even though the analysis framed as a PD says they
should not, ﬁts a general conclusion of experimental game theory: that people cooper-
ate more than predicted by the theory (Ledyard, 1995). Two recent papers, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), attempt to solve this inconsistency by
modeling individuals as having preferences not only over absolute monetary outcomes,
but also over equity in outcomes, and they show that such preferences can support ob-
served behavior in a wide range of games, including public goods games. When people
have equity concerns, they compare their resulting payoﬀ with that of others in a sim-
ilar situation, and incur disutility from over- or undercontributing, a feature conﬁrmed
experimentally (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989)). Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) consider a game of incomplete information about the types of other players, and
ﬁnd that the probability that a player contributes is increasing in the probability he
ascribes to other players contributing, which is exactly the behavior postulated by Levi
(1988), as noted above.10
9Further, Spicer and Becker (1980) report experimental evidence suggesting that tax evasion increases
for victims of (perceived) ﬁscal inequity. See Roth et al. (1989) for a survey of the behavioral approach
to tax evasion.
10Such behavior in PD games was documented experimentally already by Deutsch (1958). A diﬀerent
literature has argued that people in fact do not play a PD but rather a coordination game of (mutual)
assurance (a term coined by Sen, 1967). The two approaches are essentially equivalent. In assurance
games, it is assumed that the decision to contribute is conditional to the expected contribution of others
5Another avenue through which tax compliance could be aﬀected by ethnic fragmen-
tation is social sanctions or norms. Olson (1965) argues that social sanctions can provide
‘selective incentives,’ facilitating public goods provision and, therefore, as noted by Roth,
Scholz and Witte (1989), social stigma associated with non-compliance could improve
compliance. For social sanctions to be eﬀective, however, it is important that individ-
uals are aﬀected by such sanctions. To the extent that individuals are aﬀected mainly
by social sanctions exercised by their own ethnic group, such sanctions will not be as
eﬀective in ethnically fragmented communities as in more homogenous communities.
2.2 The vertical contract
According to the quid pro quo argument, tax compliance depends in part on tax payers
receiving “suﬃcient” public goods in return for taxes paid. Thus, if the (perceived)
rate of transformation from revenue to (favored) public goods is low, tax payers will feel
that the state has not kept its bargain, with voluntary tax compliance deteriorating as a
result. There can be two reasons for this: (a) preference divergence/favoritism; and (b)
corruption.11
It has been established empirically that public goods provision and participation
is lower in ethnically fragmented societies; see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) for US municipal level evidence, and Miguel (2001) for
micro evidence from school ﬁnancing in Kenya. The possible reasons suggested are that
diﬀerent ethnic groups may prefer diﬀerent public goods mixes and, further, that people
may not want to contribute to public goods beneﬁting other ethnic groups.12 Alesina et
(see Runge, 1984). In Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), this behavior arises endogenously, as a result of
people having preferences over both absolute and relative outcomes, but is not related to the assurance
game literature.
11This argument provides another, complementary, explanation of why corruption matters for tax
compliance, in addition to that identiﬁed by Friedman et al. (2000). They argue that ﬁrms carrying
out transactions in the formal sector make themselves subject to extortion by public oﬃcials, and that
this risk outweighs the costs incurred by the lack of contract enforcement experienced in the informal
sector.
12See Luttmer (2001) for evidence of this type of behavior regarding support for welfare spending in
the US.
6al. (1999) argue that the lower provision is determined through the political process, by
tax payers exercising their voice option. However, another way of expressing discontent
is the exit option: If taxpayers feel that the public goods mix provided is very diﬀerent
from what they would have preferred themselves, or that it beneﬁts people with whom
the taxpayer does not identify, or that the rate of transformation is low due to pervasive
corruption with much rents being appropriated by public oﬃcials and politicians, they
will feel the attractiveness of the quid pro quo contract diminished, which could lead to
lower voluntary compliance.
This argument is closely related to political legitimacy. As noted by Alt (1983, p.
185) “the legitimacy of a tax is that of the state that levies and collects it.” Therefore, if
the state is perceived to have low legitimacy, for example due to non-representativeness,
this can lead into a downward spiral of non-compliance. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), in
their analysis of multi-ethnic societies, argue that ethnic salience can result in “ethniciza-
tion of collectively provided goods” (p. 84) in the sense that the political process allocates
excludable public goods and transfers based on ethnic characteristics (favoritism). The
failure of the state to insure nonexcludeability make individuals turn to their ethnic
communities, as a sort of alternative statehoods, for the provision of public goods and
this process can initiate a vicious cycle in which ethnic communalism “breeds attitudes
of illegitimacy, which in turn reduce the eﬀectiveness of the state, and further intensify
attitudes of illegitimacy.” (p. 85).
2.3 The hypothesis
Together, the two arguments suggest that people sometimes choose to exit when the hor-
izontal or vertical contracts break down. To sum up, in both the vertical and horizontal
contracts, ethnic fragmentation decreases the degree of tax compliance and, thus, the
size of the informal sector:
Hypothesis: The size of the informal sector increases in the degree of ethnic fragmen-
tation.
73 Empirical model and data
This section sets up an empirical model for testing the hypothesis that greater ethnic
fragmentation increases the size of the informal sector. In doing so, it is necessary to
control for the level of corruption, as documented by Friedman et al. (2000). Corruption
is measured with error and likely to be endogenous to the size of the informal sector;
these problems are addressed using instrumental variables methods.
3.1 Empirical model
I estimate the following simultaneous equations model:
INFMSEC = β0 + β1CORR+ β2ETHNIC + β
∗X
C + ε (1)
and
CORR = δ0 + δ1INFMSEC + δ
∗INSTR+ ν (2)
where INFMSEC is the size of the informal sector relative to (oﬃcial) GDP; ETHNIC
is ethnic fragmentation, a measure of ethnic divisions presented below, and CORR is
a measure of corruption. XC in equation (1) includes additional controls likely to in-
ﬂuence the size of the informal sector, and INSTR includes additional determinants of
corruption, which will serve as instrumental variables. The degree of corruption is likely
to be endogenous with respect to the size of the informal sector: Where tax revenue
generation is diﬃcult — and public employment wages therefore small — public oﬃcials
and the judiciary are more likely to accept bribes and perform extortion (Burgess and
Stern, 1993). This feedback eﬀect from the size of the informal sector to corruption is
the reason for the presence of equation (2), which transforms the econometric model into
a simultaneous equations system.
The focus in this paper will be on equation (1), which will be estimated using OLS and
2SLS. Under the hypothesis of no overidentiﬁcation, which will be tested, the exogenous
variables in the second equation are valid instruments for the level of corruption in
the ﬁrst. The instrumental variables approach accounts for the possible endogeneity of
8corruption as well as the fact that corruption is measured with error (see below). While
I will not consider in detail the determinants of corruption (see Treisman (2000) for
such an analysis), it will also be of interest to estimate the full simultaneous system set
up above, as this allows for evaluating the possible feedback eﬀect from the size of the
informal sector on the level of corruption.
3.2 Data
Deﬁning the informal — or shadow, or underground — economy is diﬃcult. A commonly
used working deﬁnition is that the informal economy consists of “all currently unreg-
istered economic activities which [should] contribute to the oﬃcially calculated GDP”
(Schneider (2000, p. 4)). This includes the production of ordinary goods and services,
both from monetary and barter transactions, as well as income generated by illegal ac-
tivities. The production of ordinary goods and services in the informal economy is the
amount that should be included in the tax base.
Data for the size of the informal economy is limited, for obvious reasons. Using various
diﬀerent sources, Friedman et al. (2000) are able to obtain estimates of the size of the
informal sector in percent of GDP for 69 countries. The estimates are indirect, based on
observed electricity consumption (most non-OECD countries) or currency demand (most
OECD countries).13 In the regressions carried out below, the sample typically comprises
around ﬁfty countries due to missing data for a number of additional variables; a complete
list of countries included in the sample, and summary statistics for the data is provided
in appendix A. These methods result in estimates of the size of the informal sector
13The income (GDP) elasticity of short-run electricity consumption is typically estimated to be close
to one around the world. Thus, observed electricity consumption provides an estimate of “true” GDP
and, thus, by subtracting oﬃcial GDP, an estimate of the informal sector. For OECD countries, a similar
approach based on the demand for cash is used. The estimates for Latin American countries is based on
Loayza’s (1996) multiple-indicator multiple-cause approach, in which the size of the informal economy is
inferred from observations of the likely causes and eﬀects of the underground economy. Other estimates
for Latin America based on electricity consumption diﬀer to some extent from Loayza’s, but this does
not aﬀect results (see the discussion of robustness below).
I will not enter the controversy on measurement of the informal sector, but merely take as given the
estimates used by Friedman et al. (2000). See, e.g., Tanzi (1999) for a discussion of such estimates.
9measured with error. However, it is important to stress that the presence of (random)
measurement errors in the dependent variable does not bias the estimates, it only inﬂates
the standard error of the regression. The estimates relate to diﬀerent years, typically
around 1990-1997, and the explanatory variables have been matched whenever possible.
Ethnic divisions are measured by the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a country.
A country’s degree of ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC) is the probability that two







where ki is the share of ethnic group i in the population and I is a partitioned set of ethnic
groups in the population. The larger the number of ethnic groups and the more equal in
size, the larger is ETHNIC.D a t ao nETHNIC is taken from Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2002). They provide separate fractionalization indices
based on religion, language and ethnicity. This constitutes an important improvement
o v e rt h em o s tc o m m o n l yu s e dm e a s u r eo ff r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,t h ee t h n o - l i n g u i s t i cf r a c t i o n -
alization index, ELF, as linguistic variation can be an imprecise measure of ethnicity,
which is the main variable of interest here.
To measure corruption, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI) is used: This is a subjective measure, constructed each year sine 1995 by aggregat-
ing evaluations by experts for an expanding number of countries. It assigns to a country
a value between 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt); to facilitate interpretation, in the
results reported below the corruption scale has been inverted such that a higher value
corresponds to a higher level of corruption. A consequence of the aggregation procedure
is that the index is subject to measurement error. Such survey indices are measured with
error; however, this is corrected for by the instrumental variables approach, as are the
problems arising from possible endogeneity. As instruments we use latitude (Hall and
Jones, 1999), an indicator variable for presidential vs. parliamentary regimes (Lederman,
Loayaza and Soares (2002)), an indicator variable for transition countries, and indicator
10variables for the legal system (La Porta et al. 1999).
Finally, additional controls are included. Country studies suggest that the informal
e c o n o m yl a b o rf o r c ei so f t e nt w i c ea sh i g hi nr u r a la r e a sa si nu r b a na r e a so w i n gi np a r tt o
diﬃculties in tax collection; therefore, we expect that a higher degree of urbanization will
be associated with smaller informal sectors.14 Finally, a measure of inﬂation is included
to capture that citizens in countries with a history of high inﬂation often will be less
inclined to carry out monetary transactions, which will tend to reduce taxable income.
Typically, GDP per capita is included to control for economic development. However,
since the estimates of the informal sector are based on income elasticities with respect
to GDP, it is not surprising that this turns out signiﬁcant; therefore, the estimations are
done without controlling for the level of income, but robustness analysis (not reported)
shows that including the level of income as an additional endogenous variable does not
aﬀect the results regarding ethnic fractionalization.15 Additional controls are included
and discussed in the robustness analysis below.
4R e s u l t s
Table one presents the main results.
< Table 1 around here >
The ﬁrst two columns report the simplest cases, including only ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization and corruption. Column (1) contains the results from an OLS regression of
the size of the informal sector on ETHNIC and corruption. The ETHNIC coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level. The interpretation of the coeﬃcient is that as the
degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization increases by 10 percentage points, the informal
sector increases by 2.2 per cent of GDP. Further, the results of Friedman et al. (2000)
14See Burgess and Stern (1993, section 4.3).
15Furthermore, the level of income is strongly correlated with the level of corruption (r = −.82),a n d
including both implies strong multicollinarity. A factor analysis shows that corruption and income can
be explained by the variation in one common factor, and including an estimate of this (latent) factor in
the analysis leaves the results regarding ethnic fractionalization unchanged.
11are strongly conﬁrmed: A higher level of corruption leads to a larger informal sector.
Taken together, the two explanatory variables explain over half of the variation in the
data.
Column (2) reports results when the relationship is estimated using 2SLS to correct
for the possible endogeneity of corruption. The three bottom rows of the table reports
information on instrument validity. F (1st) reports the F-test statistic from the ﬁrst
stage regression, capturing the ability of the instruments to explain the variation in
corruption. The F-test statistics together with the high partial R2’s observed throughout
the empirical analysis indicate that the instruments are not “weak” in the sense discussed
in the recent econometrics literature on instrumental variables methods (e.g. Staiger and
Stock (1997)). An additional check on instrument validity is whether the instruments
really belong in the main estimating equation. This is possible to test as the equation
is overidentiﬁed, and the ﬁnal row reports Hansen’s J-statistic and the corresponding
probability associated with the null hypothesis of no overidentiﬁcation. Throughout, the
null cannot be rejected. The results of the 2SLS regression are largely similar to the
OLS results, although the coeﬃcient estimate of corruption is somewhat smaller.16
Columns (3) and (4) report results when additional explanatory variables are in-
cluded. The results regarding ethnic fractionalization and corruption are not aﬀected,
and urban population is strongly signiﬁcant in the expected — negative — direction, while
inﬂation is only borderline signiﬁcant. Regression (4) provides the base case regression
for the robustness analysis below, and the signiﬁc a n ta n dn e g a t i v es i g no nt h es h a r eo f
the population living in urban areas does not reject the hypothesis that more agricultural
economies have larger informal sectors.
16In fact, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman speciﬁcation test rejects that OLS results in biased estimates, but
due to the obvious endogeneity of corruption, I have chosen to use IV estimation regardless. It makes
no diﬀerence to the results. All estimations are done with robust standard errors; a Pagan-Hall test
rejects homoscedastic errors in the IV-regressions.
12F i n a l l y ,c o l u m n s( 5 )a n d( 6 )r e p o r tr e s u l t sa f t e rt h ei n c l u s i o no fE T H N I Csquared is
included, as suggested by a number of recent studies (using the ELF index).17 I ﬁnd the
squared term to be signiﬁcant (while the linear term ceases to be), but as the explanatory
power of the model is increased only slightly from the inclusion of the squared term, in
the following I keep the linear version of the model to facilitate interpretation of the
results.
4.1 Robustness
Table two reports selected robustness results. In particular, additional explanatory
variables are included: Columns (7) - (9) report results of including, respectively, re-
ligious fractionalization, marginal tax rates and economic inequality, measured by Gini-
coeﬃcients. Though religion is seldom controlled for when measuring trust at the micro-
level, religious fractionalization could potentially have eﬀects similar to those of ethnicity,
but the results do not indicate that this is the case (nor so when excluding ETHNIC).
Marginal tax rates are included to control for possible incentive eﬀects, but, as is often
the case, micro level eﬀects of tax wedges do not show up in the aggregate since measure
of taxation are often correlated with both income and corruption. Finally, another mea-
sure of societal cohesion, income inequality, is included. Howver, due to multicollinearity
between the Gini-coeﬃcient and corruption, the Gini-coeﬃcient has an unexpected mi-
nus sign; if corruption is excluded, the Gini-coeﬃcient has the expected positive sign
and is strongly signiﬁcant, without aﬀecting ETHNIC. Thus, in all three cases nothing
happens to the variables of interest and the additional variables are never signiﬁcant,
nor when including them together. In addition to these reported results, measures of
total public expenditure, openness and dependecy ratio were included, but again had no
eﬀect on the results regarding ethnic fractionalization. As noted above, including the
level of income as an endogenous variable also did not aﬀect ETHNIC.
17A number of studies ﬁnd a quadratic eﬀect of ethnolinguistic fractionaliztion on outcomes. See
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) for an example, and Collier (2001) for a survey.
13< table 2 around here >
The two last columns of table two reports the results when diﬀerent measures of
corruption and the informal sector are used. Column (10) employs a measure of “Gov-
ernment Corruption”, averaged over 1990-1995, from the International Country Risk
Guide. ETHNIC remains unchanged. For some countries Friedman et al. (2000) report
two estimates of the size of the informal sector, and while they use a primary sample,
their results continue to hold if they use their secondary sample. Column (11) reports
results when their secondary sample is employed; the results are generally unchanged,
though the eﬀect of ETHNIC is slightly less precisely estimated.
Finally, I do a fully joint system estimation of the size of the informal sector and
corruption. I estimate the simultaneous equations system (1) and (2) by three-stage
least squares, using both measures of corruption employed above. The two ﬁrst columns
of table three report the results for the CPI: Ethnic fractionalization is signiﬁcant at the
99 percent level, and so is corruption (endogenously determined in the second column);
furthermore, note from the second column that the size of the informal sector signiﬁcantly
increases corruption. The two columns on the right uses instead Government Corruption
as an endogenous variable, which leaves the results are unchanged.
< Table 3 around here >
Taken together, the results suggest that the hypothesis presented above can be sup-
ported by the data. Throughout, while conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Friedman et al. (2000)
concerning corruption, I ﬁnd that the size of the informal sector is increasing in the
degree of ethnic fractionalization and in the share of the population living rural areas.
Further, these results are robust to various measures of corruption, additional control
variables, and controlling for endogeneity.
145 Concluding remarks
The analysis of this paper should be seen as a preliminary empirical inquiry into the
eﬀect of social structures on the size of the informal sector and the degree of tax compli-
ance. In particular, an extension of the sample of countries is warranted. For example,
we conjecture that including estimates from more African countries would support the
hypothesis put forward here: African countries are ethnically very heterogenous and, at
the anecdotal level, characterized by large informal sectors. A crucial problem that more
data will not solve, however, follows from the nature of the informal sector data; this data
is (perhaps very) imprecisely estimated, and, therefore, one should be very cautious in
making results such as these the basis for policy intervention or policy recommendation.
Rather, the goal of the present analysis is to emphasize, once again, the importance of
social and ethnic heterogeneity on public sector outcomes.
An interesting empirical extension would be to test the hypothesis on U.S. micro data.
Such data, collected thought the IRS’ Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, are
much more precise than aggregate country estimates and at the same time could help
mitigate many problems associated with cross-country studies. Unfortunately, the use
of this data is severely restricted.
As for economic development, the results of this paper contribute to the bad news
associated with ethnic fractionalization. While Collier (2001), in a careful review of
the evidence, concludes that the diﬃculties facing ethnically diverse societies have been
greatly exaggerated, he concedes that regarding “the public sector there is evidence that
ethnically diﬀerentiated organizations encounter problems.” (Collier, 2001, p. 154). In
particular, the results of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(1999) suggest that public expenditures are lower, and less eﬃciently allocated, in frag-
mented communities.
The results of this paper conﬁrm the problems of the public sector in ethnically
fragmented societies, but suggest that such problems exist also on the revenue side of
the public budget. This suggests that trying to improve the public sector in fragmented
15societies by improving allocative eﬃciency on the expenditure side, for example — as
suggested by Collier — by reducing ethnic employment patronage, while securing a better
vertical contract could be insuﬃcient to secure a better public sector if problems of the
horizontal contract persist.
In a broader context, Collier (2001) suggests that one should simply accept the fact
that the public sector is relatively less eﬀective in diverse societies than in more homoge-
nous societies, so that the role of the public sector relative to the private sector should
be redeﬁned in such societies. This does not necessarily mean that public goods will not
be provided, as it could to some extent be provided through ethnic groups, but perhaps
that public goods will be provided less eﬀectively, and in smaller scale.
16Table 1. Empirical results

















































N 52 51 45 45 45 45
R2 .57 .54 .68 .67 .70 .70

















Dependent variable is size of informal sector to GDP. Estimated using ivreg2 in STATA 7.0. A
constant was included in all regressions, but is not reported. Robust t-values (z-values) are
reported in parenthesis for OLS (IV). ***, ** and * denote signiﬁc a n c ea t9 9 ,9 5a n d9 0p e r
cent levels, respectively.
17Table 2. Robustness



















































N 45 45 41 43 45
R2 (centered) .68 .67 .71 .70 .58

























Dependent variable is size of informal sector to GDP. Estimated using ivreg2 in STATA 7.0. A
constant was included in all regressions, but is not reported. Robust z-values are reported in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 99, 95 and 90 per cent levels, respectively.
a) In regression (10), corruption is measured by "Government Corruption" rather than TI’s
CPI.
b) In regression (11), the dependent variable is from secondary sample, cf. the text.
18Table 3. Systems estimation (3SLS)
System 1 (CPI) System 2 (GCORR)



















































N 45 45 43 43
R2 .67 .78 .70 .71
χ2 81.6 152.5 88.0 94.5
Estimated in STATA 7.0. A constant was included in all regressions, but is not reported.
z-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 99, 95 and 90 per
cent levels, respectively. R2 does not have the usual interpretation in instrumental variables
models.
19AD a t a
Countries included in the 52 country sample: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Germany, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece,
Guatemala, Hong Kong, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Singapore,
Thailand, Uruguay, USA and Venezuela.
Table A: Summary statistics
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. min max
Informal sector 52 24.7 17.9 5.9 76
Corruption Perceptions Index 52 5.2 2.4 1.5 10
Ethnic fractionalization 52 0.33 .22 .002 .85
Urban population (percent) 51 67.6 18.4 20.17 100
Inﬂation, 1990-95 46 85.7 284.6 1.65 1400.3
Government corruption 47 4.0 1.2 2 6
Gini coeﬃcient 47 38.6 10.7 23.1 60
Religious fractionalization 52 0.39 0.22 .004 .82
Marginal tax rates 52 40.9 13.4 0 67
Latitude (0-1 scale) 52 0.36 0.20 .02 .67
Presidential system dummy 51 0.47 .50 0 1
Transition country 52 0.15 .36 0 1
British law 52 .23 .43 0 1
Scandinavian law 52 .06 .24 0 1
German law 52 .08 .27 0 1
20Table B: Data sources
Variable Source
Informal sector Friedman et al. (2000); Schneider and Enste (2000)
Corruption Perceptions Index http://www.transparency.org
Ethnic, religious Alesina et al. (2002)
Urban, inﬂ9095 World Development Indicators (1999)
Legal variables World Bank CAIRO dataset.
Government corruption, gini Available through http://www.worldbank.org/research/
Marginal tax rates Gwartney and Lawson (2000)
Latitude Hall and Jones (1999)
Presidential system dummy Beck et al. (2000)
Transition countries Available through http://www.worldbank.org/research/
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